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Non-Verbal Victims in the Adversarial Criminal Process 
Communication, Competency, and Credibility 
 
 
Abstract 
Research consistently shows that persons with learning disabilities are more likely to be victims of 
crime. For such victims, engaging with the criminal justice system may be fraught with difficulties 
given the expectation that victims should normally articulate verbally and with fluency both their 
testimony and their views on issues pertaining to the justice process itself. Grounded in the principle 
of orality and often likened to a system of gladiatorial combat, adversarial justice systems have a 
poor track record of hearing the voices of victims of crime who have learning disabilities. However, 
recent years have witnessed an attitudinal shift towards meeting the needs of victims who require 
communication support; with legal and policy reforms introduced across multiple jurisdictions 
designed to enable more effective participation in the justice process. Augmentative & Alternative 
Communication (AAC) could constitute an important support mechanism to enable and empower 
victims of crime who would struggle to express themselves verbally in the courtroom; yet these 
alternative forms of voice are alien to the oral tradition and sit uneasily within the priority 
traditionally afforded to adversarial questioning techniques. 
Keywords 
Victims, witnesses, disabilities, communication, competency, credibility, AAC 
Introduction 
There is a growing corpus of literature documenting the specific difficulties experienced by victims 
with learning disabilities within the criminal process.
1
 Disabled persons are at a considerably higher 
risk of victimisation generally, and disability hate crime and sexual offences in particular.
2
   They are 
often highly dependent on paid or family caregivers for assistance in multiple domains including 
managing personal finances, personal (intimate) care and social care which may create opportunities 
for abusers; and people with learning disabilities may be less likely to realise the nature of the 
offence and/or report it.
3
 This article focuses on the issues facing such victims as they are often the 
only sources of evidence, though much of what we argue is equally applicable to non-victim 
                                                          
1
 “ee eg JessiĐa JoŶes, ͚PeƌsoŶs ǁith iŶtelleĐtual disaďilities iŶ the ĐƌiŵiŶal justiĐe sǇsteŵ: ƌeǀieǁ of issues͛ 
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individuals with seǀeƌe ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ disaďilitǇ͛ (2016) 29 Acta Criminol 12. 
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witnesses (including defendants). Questioning techniques and the stress of the investigation can 
disorientate many witnesses; they may appear to be inarticulate or may make inconsistent 
statements. Perceptions that they are incapable of providing credible evidence or that they are 
unlikely to cross the competency threshold (sometimes held by victims themselves) mean that many 
complaints are not made, not taken seriously, or fall to the wayside before they reach court.
4
 
This article explores the participatory barriers facing a specific sub-group of learning disabled 
witnesses, namely those who might be described as ͚ŶoŶ-ǀeƌďal͛ oƌ ͚ŵiŶiŵallǇ ǀeƌďal͛. Until very 
recently at least, such victims have largely remained invisible to both researchers and criminal justice 
professionals.
5
   At the outset, it is worth clarifying what these labels mean, given that they are 
contested terms across different disciplines (including speech therapy, education studies and 
psychology).
6
 For present purposes, we define a non-verbal witness as one who does not have 
enough command of any language system (oral/spoken, signed or technology-mediated) to deliver 
verbal evidence fluently and would require significant communication support such as the provision 
of a limited selection of picture symbols to indicate meaning and/or the support of a communication 
partner. This is likely to arise from autism, Severe Learning Disabilities (SLD) or Profound and 
Multiple Learning Disabilities (PMLD) which may stem from an acquired brain injury or from a 
genetic, congenital or neurological impairment.
7
  Our working definition therefore does not 
encompass disabled witnesses who have access to a complex language system which provides a 
comparable equivalent to oral testimony such as Deaf witnesses (since British Sign Language is a 
language system in its own right) or witnesses with Motor Neurone Disease and high cognitive 
functioning who can produce fluent accounts through an electronic communication device.  Rather, 
our focus is on witnesses who have limited language (through any medium) and will require 
significant support including symbolisation of words and/or communication partner support so they 
can access participatory rights on an equal footing.  
Drawing on recent developments to support vulnerable witnesses in the criminal process of England 
and Wales, we undertake a thematic analysis of the nature of these participatory barriers and how 
they might be overcome. The most obvious starting point concerns the question of communication. 
Verbal interaction is the norm in most such settings – and the principle of orality has long been 
                                                          
4
 Deiƌdƌe BƌoǁŶ aŶd Chaƌlie Leǁis, ͚CoŵpeteŶĐe is iŶ the eǇe of the ďeholdeƌ: PeƌĐeptioŶs of iŶtelleĐtuallǇ 
disaďled Đhild ǁitŶesses͛ ;ϮϬϭϯͿ ϲϬ;ϭͿ Int J Disab Dev Ed ϯ; Gill GƌeeŶ, ͚VulŶeƌaďility of witnesses with learning 
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intellectual disaďilities͛ ;ϮϬϭϭͿ ϱϱ;ϰͿ Journal of Intellectual Disability Research 385; Helen Westcott and David 
Jones, ͚AŶŶotatioŶ: The aďuse of disaďled ĐhildƌeŶ͛ ;ϭϵϵϵͿ ϰϬ J Child Psychol Psychiatry 497.  
5
 Notable exceptions are a range of studies relating to non-verbal participants in the South African criminal 
justice system. See Bornman and others (n 1); Diane Bryen and Christopher Wickman, Ending the silence of 
people with little or no functional speech: Testifying in court. (2011) 31 DSQ: accessed at http://dsq-
sds.org/article/view/1711 on 30/06/17; ‘oďǇŶ White aŶd otheƌs, ͚Testifying in court as a victim of crime for 
persons with little oƌ Ŷo fuŶĐtioŶal speeĐh: VoĐaďulaƌǇ iŵpliĐatioŶs͛ ;ϮϬϭϱͿ ϭϲ Child Abuse Res South Afr 1. 
6
 CatheƌiŶe Loƌd aŶd otheƌs, ͚The Autisŵ DiagŶostiĐ OďseƌǀatioŶ “Đhedule—Generic: A standard measure of 
soĐial aŶd ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ defiĐits assoĐiated ǁith the speĐtƌuŵ of autisŵ͛ ;ϮϬϬϬͿ ϯϬ;ϯͿ J Autism Dev Disord 
205. 
7
 For instance, approximately 30% of people with a diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder are non-verbal or 
ŵiŶiŵallǇ ǀeƌďal, ǁith ͚ŵiŶiŵallǇ ǀeƌďal͛ deŶotiŶg Ŷo ŵoƌe thaŶ ϮϬ-ϯϬ spokeŶ ǁoƌds: HeleŶ Tageƌ‐
FlusďeƌgaŶd CoŶŶie Kasaƌi, ͚MiŶiŵallǇ ǀeƌďal sĐhool‐aged ĐhildƌeŶ ǁith autisŵ speĐtƌuŵ disoƌder: the 
ŶegleĐted eŶd of the speĐtƌuŵ͛ ;ϮϬϭϯͿ ϲ;ϲͿ Aut Res 468. Occasionally some forms of dementia may also result 
suďstaŶtial laŶguage loss: HaŶs Föƌstl aŶd AleǆaŶdeƌ Kuƌz. ͚CliŶiĐal featuƌes of Alzheiŵeƌ͛s disease͛ ;ϭϵϵϵͿ 
249(6) Eur Arch Psychiatry Clin Neurosci 288.  
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considered part of the bedrock of adversarial trial.
 8
 We aim to explain the various alternative forms 
of voice for those who do not communicate verbally, outlining how Augmentative and Alternative 
Communication (AAC) offers an auspicious mechanism that can enable meaningful interaction using 
approaches such as Picture Exchange Communication Systems (PECS), Makaton signing, or speech-
generating devices (SGDs).
9
  We analyse some of the positive developments that have occurred in 
relation to facilitating such witnesses and the opportunities that lie ahead, and the valuable role that 
intermediaries and aids to communication can play in facilitating these. 
Having highlighted the ways in which voice might be exercised, the second part of the article 
explores the issue of competency. Some witnesses with severe learning difficulties will not be 
deemed capable of giving intelligible evidence and, as such, will be considered incompetent to 
testify. However, recent years have seen a more enlightened approach from the courts in 
determining such matters; and many non-verbal witnesses may now be deemed competent to 
testify.   
The final part of the article turns to the issue of credibility. The evidence of learning disabled 
witnesses has long been viewed through a lens of suspicion, and as noted above, this goes some way 
to explaining the high attrition rate. It is suggested that negative perceptions of credibility are 
further compounded by the use of an atypical means of communication which, when aggravated by 
the structural deficiencies of the adversarial model of proof, means that justice is often denied for 
some of the most vulnerable in society. 
Communication 
The effectiveness and responsiveness of the public prosecutions system hinges upon vulnerable 
voices being heard and being taken seriously. The question then arises as to hoǁ the ͚ďest eǀideŶĐe͛ 
of such witnesses can be best facilitated. Evidently, non-verbal victims face a unique challenge in this 
regard since they do not express themselves verbally. 
Alternative Forms of Voice 
One possible mechanism that might empower witnesses to interact more effectively with the 
criminal justice system is Augmentative and Alternative Communication (AAC). AAC refers to a 
burgeoning area of educational and clinical practice which aims to provide a range of 
communication methods to suppleŵeŶt oƌ ƌeplaĐe a peƌsoŶ͛s Ŷatuƌal speeĐh aŶd ǁhiĐh is geŶeƌallǇ 
acknowledged to have emerged as recognised professional specialisation in the 1980s.
10
  Three of 
the most common methods of communication support which fall within the umbrella term AAC 
include speech-generating devices or SGDs (also known as Voice-Output Communication Aids or 
VOCAs) which may be operated by hand or through eye-gaze recognition technology; the use of 
symbol/picture cards; and the use of simplified manual signing systems designed for people with 
                                                          
8
 Patrick Devlin, The Judge (OUP 1979) 54. 
9
 KieƌoŶ “heehǇ aŶd Hesteƌ DuffǇ, ͚Attitudes to MakatoŶ iŶ the ages oŶ iŶtegƌatioŶ aŶd iŶĐlusioŶ͛ ;ϮϬϬϵͿ Ϯϰ;ϮͿ 
Intl J Spec Educ ϵϭ; “ue ‘oulstoŶe aŶd otheƌs, ͚IŶteƌǀeŶtioŶs foƌ ĐhildƌeŶ ǁith speeĐh, language and 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ Ŷeeds: AŶ eǆploƌatioŶ of ĐuƌƌeŶt pƌaĐtiĐe͛ ;ϮϬϭϮͿ Ϯϴ;ϯͿ Child LaŶg TeaĐh Theƌ ϯϮϱ. 
10
 Ralf Schlosser and others, 'Speech output and speech-geŶeƌatiŶg deǀiĐes iŶ autisŵ speĐtƌuŵ disoƌdeƌs͛ iŶ 
Pat Mirenda and Teresa Iacono (eds), Autism Spectrum Disorders and AAC (Brookes Publishing, 2009); Carole 
)aŶgaƌi aŶd otheƌs, ͚AugŵeŶtatiǀe aŶd alteƌŶatiǀe ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ: AŶ histoƌiĐ peƌspeĐtiǀe͛ ;ϭϵϵϰͿ ϭϬ;ϭͿ 
Augment Altern Commun 27. 
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learning disabilities such as Makaton which draw upon the vocabulary of signed languages such as 
British Sign Language but which have significantly less grammatical complexity.
11
  However, a rich 
diversity of other methods also exist including the use of writing, drawing, the use of artefacts such 
as dolls to re-enact scenarios; and any approach which aims to facilitate communication by 
supplementing or replacing natural speech with alternative mediums may be said to constitute a 
form of AAC. 
It ǁould ďe a ŵistake to thiŶk of ͚AAC useƌs͛ as a hoŵogeŶeous gƌoup of ǁitŶesses as theƌe ǁill ďe 
wide variations in a range of factors, both individual and environmental, which will subsequently 
influence their communication output.  A useful model for conceptualising this interplay of factors is 
the biopsychosocial model of disability recommended by the Woƌld Health OƌgaŶisatioŶ͛s 
International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health or ICF.
12
  This biopsychosocial model 
conceptualises dis/ability as an emergent property of the interplay between individual impairment 
and environmental barriers and facilitators.  According to this model, therefore, the successful 
facilitation of testimony by an AAC user would need to take account of both the useƌ͛s iŶdividual 
characteristics and the extent of environmental communication barriers and facilitators.  Individual 
variables might include level of cognitive functioning; degree of mastery of chosen communication 
mediums; level of physical independence in operating AAC; level of social/emotional support and 
encouragement required; and psychological factors such as their degree of confidence and 
motivation in using AAC generally as well as their level of resilience to the stress of giving evidence.   
Environmental factors (in the immediate courtroom context) might include the experience and 
knowledge of the intermediary appointed to support the user; the suitability of the AAC provision 
which is put in place; the extent and limitations of the vocabulary set provided by that AAC; and the 
degƌee to ǁhiĐh the peƌsoŶ͛s Ŷeeds aƌe effeĐtiǀelǇ ideŶtified aŶd ŵet iŶ ƌelatioŶ to issues suĐh as 
clear questioning techniques and minimisation of sensory distractions.  Finally, more distal 
environmental factors coŵe iŶto plaǇ suĐh as the ǁitŶess͛s pƌioƌ eǆpeƌieŶĐe of AAC thƌough 
education settings and/or Speech and Language Therapy services.  A witness who has their own 
familiar and well-established AAC system (whether that be embedded and extensive knowledge of 
Makaton signing or their own Speech-Generating Device in everyday usage) has the advantage over 
a witness who has only recently been introduced to AAC as part of the evidence-giving process; and 
a witness who is already familiar with sign or symbol vocabulary sets relevant to (for example) sexual 
abuse such as private body parts  will be further advantaged.  This complex interplay of factors will 
produce a diverse range of AAC users, from those who can convey basic short messages such as 
yes/no or 1-2 word phrases to users who can rapidly and confidently combine symbols or signs to 
answer a range of questions. 
It is important to clarify the distinction between AAC and Facilitated Communication (FC).  FC is a 
controversial technique which involves a facilitator supporting a person to spell out messages on an 
alphaďet ďoaƌd thƌough aŶǇ ĐoŵďiŶatioŶ of phǇsiĐal suppoƌt to the peƌsoŶ͛s aƌŵ oƌ haŶd; verbal 
prompts and moral support; often producing startling outcomes of fluent, highly literate 
communication where communication ability of this level had not been evidenced previously.  FC 
has a controversial history in the courtroom, having been implicated in multiple instances of sexual 
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 Roulstone and others (n 9); Sheehy and Duffy (n 9). 
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 World Health Organisation, International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health, res 54.21 
(2001). 
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abuse allegations which were subsequently found to be untrue, with authorship suspected to lie 
with the facilitator.
13
 FC is not accepted as a legitimate AAC intervention by the International Society 
for Augmentative and Alternative Communication,
14
 and its troubling courtroom history makes it 
worthy of mention for two reasons: firstly, to raise awareness of the possibility that jury perceptions 
of ͚ǀaliditǇ͛ aŶd ͚authoƌship͛ of AAC-mediated evidence more generally may be compromised by the 
history of FC in particular; and secondly to highlight the need for further unpacking of the different 
dimensions of support offered by intermediaries (social, emotional, organisational, communicative, 
physical) and the implications of these for perceived validity and authorship.  These questions are 
discussed further below. 
The technologies outlined above have undoubtedly empowered voices that have long gone unheard 
in a range of social settings. While the use of these technologies is relatively novel within criminal 
justice, and there are few reported cases on their use in legal settings,
15
  there is a growing body of 
evidence that such aids are becoming much more commonplace.
16
 The evidence gathered within 
other social settings suggests that, if properly used, AAC holds the potential to empower non-verbal 
victims through reducing levels of stress and facilitating them to give best evidence.  
Facilitating Communication 
The main statutory framework that assists non-verbal victims is contained in Part II of the 
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.
17
 Under section 16, any witness whose quality of 
evidence is likely to be diminished because, inter alia, they have a significant impairment of 
intelligence and social functioning is presumed to be eligible for a special measures direction. 
The court must satisfy itself that the special measure or combination of special measures is 
likely to improve the quality of the witness's evidence iŶ teƌŵs of ͚ĐoŵpleteŶess, ĐoheƌeŶĐe 
aŶd aĐĐuƌaĐǇ͛.18 In total, eight such measures are set out in sections 23 to 30 of the Act. 
Ordinarily, witnesses with learning disabilities may expect to receive the benefit of pre-
recorded evidence and the use of a televised link for the purposes of cross-examination in 
chief,
19
 and advocates and judges may remove wigs and gowns.
20
 Often, measures such as 
removal of wigs and gowns and the use of a live link or pre-recorded examination-in-chief are 
unlikely to be particularly contentious. One of the most radical measures is contained in 
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 “ee geŶeƌallǇ JohŶ JaĐoďsoŶ aŶd otheƌs, ͚A histoƌǇ of faĐilitated ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ: “ĐieŶĐe, pseudosĐieŶĐe, 
and antiscience science working group oŶ faĐilitated ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ͛ ;ϭϵϵϱͿ ϱϬ;ϵͿ Amer Psychol 750; Jason 
Tƌaǀeƌs aŶd otheƌs ͚FaĐilitated ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ deŶies people ǁith disaďilities theiƌ ǀoiĐe͛ ;ϮϬϭϰͿ ϯϵ;ϯͿ  Res 
Pract Persons Severe Disabl 195. 
14
 “usaŶ BalaŶdiŶ, ͚I“AAC PositioŶ “tateŵeŶt oŶ FaĐilitated CoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ͛ ;ϮϬϭϰͿ ϯϬ;ϰͿ Augment Altern 
Commun 357. 
15
 An exception can be located in R v Watts [2010] EWCA Crim 1924, where one witness was entirely incapable 
of speech or any other form of communication and where evidence from one non-verbal witness was 
facilitated through eye gaze technology and an electronic communication device. Her ABE interview was 
admitted under s116(2) CJA 2003 as an exception to the hearsay rule. 
16
 See generally Joyce Plotnikoff and Richard Woolfson, Intermediaries in the Criminal Justice System (Policy 
Press 2015).  
17
 Special measures are not, however, available to defendants. A live link may be made available in certain 
ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes uŶdeƌ YJCEA ϭϵϵϵ, s ϯϯA. IŶteƌŵediaƌies ŵaǇ also ďe used iŶ ͚ƌaƌe͛ Đases foƌ defeŶdaŶts: Cƌiŵ 
PD ;AŵeŶdŵeŶt No.ϭͿ [ϮϬϭϲ] EWCA Cƌiŵ ϵϳ. “ee fuƌtheƌ Lauƌa HoǇaŶo aŶd AŶgela ‘affeƌtǇ, ͚‘atioŶiŶg 
defence intermediaries under the Apƌil ϮϬϭϲ CƌiŵiŶal PƌaĐtiĐe DiƌeĐtioŶ͛ ;ϮϬϭϳͿ Cƌiŵ L‘ ϵϯ. 
18
 YJCEA 1999, ss 16(5) and 19(2). 
19
 YJCEA 1999, ss 27 and 24 respectively. 
20
 YJCEA 1999, s 26. 
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section 28 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, which provides for the cross-
examination and re-examination of the witness in advance of the trial. Receipt of the entire 
testimony of a vulnerable witness outside the formal courtroom environment in advance of the 
trial clearly holds the potential to significantly reduce fear and apprehension and to allow the 
witness to achieve some sense of closure within a relatively short time frame after the offence. 
However – citing concerns among the profession about its practical operation – the 
Government declined to implement this provision when most of the other special measures 
came into force in July 2002. A pilot programme was eventually trialled at three Crown Court 
Centres at the end of 2013, but at the time of writing the prospect of national implementation 
remains uncertain. In terms of specific support for non-verbal witnesses that are currently 
available, two key provisions merit further consideration. Sections 29 and 30 provide for the 
use of intermediaries and the use of aids to communication respectively.  
Intermediaries 
Under section 29 of the Act, a court may order that an eligible witness may be examined through an 
independent intermediary in order to communicate ͚questions put to the witness, and to any 
persons asking such questions, the answers given by the witness in reply to them, and to explain 
such questions or answers so far as necessary to empowered them to be understood by the witness 
or person in question.͛21 Designed to assist witnesses with severe communication difficulties, 
intermediaries were first piloted in 2004, before a phased national roll-out began in 2008. The 
scheme has since made a significant impact on access to justice in cases which would never have 
previously gone to trial.
22
 
Ordinarily, a non-verbal victim should be identified at an early stage in the investigative process,
23
 
and at this stage the Achieving Best Evidence process is triggered.
24
 The police and other criminal 
justice agencies should adhere to best practice guidelines laid down in respect of interviewing and 
questioning techniques to ensure that vulnerable witnesses are empowered to give their ͚ďest͛ 
evidence. A registered intermediary, selected from a range of professionals with various skills sets, 
will then be matched with the witness by the National Crime Agency to assess the witness and make 
recommendations to various criminal justice personnel (such as police officers, advocates, judges 
and magistrates, Witness Service and court personnel) as to how the witness should be 
questioned.
25
 In many cases, this results in a video-recorded interview being used to substitute the 
Đhild͛s liǀe eǀideŶĐe-in-chief in court.26  
                                                          
21
 YJCEA, s 29(2). 
22
 One evaluation estimated that more than half of cases evaluated would not have reached court without 
intermediary involvement: Joyce Plotnikoff and Richard Woolfson, The ͚Go-Betǁeen͛: eǀaluation of 
intermediary pathfinder projects (Ministry of Justice 2007). 
23
 In other cases, certain disabilities or other forms of vulnerability may not be so readily apparent. See further 
BƌeŶdaŶ O'MahoŶǇ aŶd otheƌs, ͚The eaƌlǇ ideŶtifiĐatioŶ of ǀulŶeƌaďle ǁitŶesses pƌioƌ to aŶ iŶǀestigatiǀe 
iŶteƌǀieǁ͛ ;ϮϬϭϭͿ ϭϯ British Journal of Forensic Practice 114. 
24
 Ministry of Justice, Achieving Best Evidence in Criminal Proceedings (Ministry of Justice 2011). 
25
 PeŶŶǇ Coopeƌ aŶd MiĐhelle MattiŶsoŶ, ͚IŶteƌŵediaƌies, ǀulŶeƌaďle people aŶd the ƋualitǇ of eǀideŶĐe: AŶ 
iŶteƌŶatioŶal ĐoŵpaƌisoŶ of thƌee ǀeƌsioŶs of the EŶglish iŶteƌŵediaƌǇ ŵodel͛ ;ϮϬϭϳͿ 21(4) 4 E&P 351; 
Plotnikoff and Woolfson (n 16).  
26
 BeĐkǇ MilŶe aŶd ‘aǇ Bull, ͚IŶteƌǀieǁiŶg ǀiĐtiŵs of Đƌiŵe, iŶĐludiŶg ĐhildƌeŶ aŶd people ǁith iŶtelleĐtual 
disaďilities͛ iŶ Mark R. Kebbell and Graham Davies, Practical psychology for forensic investigations and 
prosecutions (John Wiley 2006). 
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The initial assessment of a non-verbal victim by an intermediary should analyse the communicative 
capacities of the person concerned. This process can thus be used to identify users of AAC; the type 
of AAC technology relied upon, and the understanding, fluency and skill level of the user. This varies 
considerably from individual to individual. The intermediary is tasked with making 
͚ƌeĐoŵŵeŶdatioŶs as to speĐial ŵeasuƌes to eŶaďle the ďest ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ͛,27 and the report 
should detail the ability and fluency of the AAC user and recommendations on what form of 
questions should be put to the witness.
28
 Often, questioners will be advised of ways to explain basic 
gƌouŶd ƌules to ǁitŶesses suĐh as ͚doŶ͛t guess͛ oƌ ͚tell the tƌuth͛.29 Although ABE interviews 
generally place emphasis on the need for free narrative, witnesses with learning difficulties may 
often require more structured and closed questions as many are reluctant to respond to open 
invitations.
30
 These recommendations will then be communicated to criminal justice professionals to 
inform decision-making about whether, and if so how, the investigation should proceed and a trial 
should be held. Where a case proceeds to trial, intermediaries will often attend a familiarisation visit 
with the witness and sit with the witness throughout proceedings. They are expected to monitor 
questioning and ͚aĐtiǀelǇ to iŶteƌǀeŶe ǁheŶ miscommunication may or is likely to have occurred or 
to ďe oĐĐuƌƌiŶg͛ (though their primary duty is to the court).31 
Evidently, this represents a radical departure from the archetypal adversarial duel and ͚vigorous and 
polaƌized͛ deďates haǀe takeŶ plaĐe oŶ intermediaries since they were first proposed by the Pigot 
Committee in 1989.
32
 Concerns have been expressed that the filtering of questioning could result in 
the loss of meaning, intonation and emphasis leading to questions as to how effective a defence the 
accused is able to mount in these circumstances.
33
 It also represents a threat to the longstanding 
principle of party control of evidence,
34
 and whether they are sufficiently equipped to identify and 
object to inappropriate lines of questioning.
35
 The ƌisk of iŶteƌŵediaƌies ͚oǀeƌƌeaĐhiŶg͛ theiƌ ƌole ǁas 
addressed by the Court of Appeal in R v Christian,
36
 where an intermediary put her arm around a 
witness when she became distressed, comforted her during her cross-examination, and asked 
counsel to moderate the tone of her voice. The judge instructed the jury not to allow sympathy for 
the complainant as a person to cloud their judgement of her as a witness. The appellaŶt͛s ĐoŶĐeƌŶ 
that these aĐtioŶs iŶteƌfeƌed ǁith the defeŶdaŶt͛s ƌight to a faiƌ heaƌiŶg ǁas disŵissed; ǁith the 
Court stating that the question was not whether the intermediary had overstepped her proper role, 
but whether there was any serious risk of unfairness. Given the judicial direction, there was no 
sensible prospect of unfairness in the current case.  
                                                          
27
 Ministry of Justice, Registered Intermediary Procedural Guidance Manual (Ministry of Justice 2012). 
28
 The report may cover other issues, such as how a witness might best be supported emotionally: Michelle 
MattiŶsoŶ, ͚PuttiŶg TheoƌǇ iŶto PƌaĐtiĐe: A CoŵpaƌisoŶ of the GuidaŶĐe Aǀailaďle to IŶǀestigatiǀe IŶteƌǀieǁeƌs 
aŶd AdǀoĐates ǁheŶ usiŶg CoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ Aids iŶ the CƌiŵiŶal JustiĐe “Ǉsteŵ͛ iŶ PeŶŶǇ Coopeƌ aŶd LiŶda 
Hunting (eds), Addressing Vulnerability in Justice Systems (Widly, Simmonds and Hill 2016). 
29
 Cooper and Mattinson (n 25); Plotnikoff and Woolfson (n 16) 88.  
30
 Plotnikoff and Woolfson (n 16) 90-91. 
31
 R v Cox [2012] 2 Cr App R 6, [28]. 
32
 Lauran Hoyano and Caroline Keenan, Child Abuse Law and Policy across Boundaries (2007 OUP), 663. 
33
 JoŶathaŶ Doak, ViĐtiŵs͛ ‘ights, HuŵaŶ ‘ights aŶd CƌiŵiŶal JustiĐe: ‘eĐoŶĐeiǀiŶg the ‘ole of Thiƌd Paƌties 
(Hart 2008). 
34
 EŵilǇ HeŶdeƌsoŶ ͚͟A ǀeƌǇ ǀaluaďle tool͟ Judges, adǀoĐates aŶd iŶteƌŵediaƌies disĐuss the iŶteƌŵediaƌǇ 
sǇsteŵ iŶ EŶglaŶd aŶd Wales͛ ;ϮϬϭϱͿϭϵ;ϯͿ E&P 154. 
35
 Laura Hoyano, 'Reforming the Adversarial Trial for Vulnerable Witnesses and Defendants' (2015) Crim LR 
105. 
36
 [2015] EWCA Crim 1582. 
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There are grounds for optimism in that many advocates now recognise that intermediaries can make 
a valuable contribution to decision-making processes, particularly concerning which cases to pursue 
and specific strategies that could be adopted to prevent miscommunication at trial.
37
 Interviews 
conducted with judges and advocates as part of a study by Emily Henderson in 2013 found 
ǁidespƌead ͚eŶthusiasŵ aŶd ǁaƌŵth͛ foƌ iŶteƌŵediaƌies, aŶd that ǁidespƌead feaƌs oǀeƌ ƌesistaŶĐe 
from the profession had not materialised.
38
 Other studies have arrived at similar conclusions, and 
law reform bodies across the globe have also looked to the English model.
39
 While concerns remain 
that some advocates continue to hold reservations or lack the specialist knowledge that would 
enable them to conduct appropriate questioning,
40
 ongoing education and training may be capable 
of addressing this issue.
41
 
Aids to Communication 
The use of an intermediary alone is unlikely to facilitate the evidence of non-verbal witnesses. In 
addition, such witnesses are likely to need the assistance of some form of AAC to express 
themselves. To this end, section 30 of the Act provides that the court may direct that a witness is 
peƌŵitted to use aŶ ͚aid to ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ͛; iŶteƌŵediaƌies ǁill ƌeĐoŵŵeŶd ǁhiĐh aids ŵight 
improve communication on the basis of the individual needs of the witness. Aids to communication 
may thus not only enhance the quality of evidence, but may also reduce stress levels of the user.
42
 
Oddly, no definition of what might constitute such an aid is provided in the legislation itself; anything 
deemed appropriate to the court is permissible although both the Equal Treatment Bench Book and 
the Criminal Procedure Rules 2015 refer to an array of tools such as pictures, plans, symbols, dolls, 
figures, models, body maps and similar aids.
43
  
On a practical level however, concerns have been expressed that advocates and judges, in particular, 
are unfamiliar with the range of aids available and their potential to empower witnesses who lack 
verbal skills. There are some positive indications, however, that levels of understanding are 
improving. The Inns of Court College of Advocacy (formerly the Advocacy Training Council) has 
developed an online portal, The AdǀoĐate͛s GateǁaǇ, which is designed to offer evidence-based 
guidance to advocates, police officers, social workers, solicitors, guardians and judges who may 
encounter vulnerable witnesses or defendants at some point in their journey through the criminal 
justice system.
44
 “eǀeŶteeŶ sepaƌate ͚toolkits͛ aƌe aǀailaďle aŶd Toolkit 14, Using Communication 
Aids in the Criminal Justice System, is one of the few forms of judicial guidance that make express 
reference to the use of high-tech and low-tech forms of AAC outlined above.
45
 Toolkit 14, in addition 
                                                          
37
 JoǇĐe PlotŶikoff aŶd ‘iĐhaƌd WoolfsoŶ, ͚MakiŶg ďest use of the iŶteƌŵediaƌǇ speĐial ŵeasuƌe͛ ;ϮϬϬϴͿ Crim 
LR 91. 
38
 Henderson (n 34) 168. 
39
 Cooper and Mattinson, (n 25); Kirsten Hanna and others, Child Witnesses in the New Zealand Criminal 
Courts: a Review of Practice and Implications for Policy (NZ Law Foundation 2010); Plotnikoff and Woolfson (n 
ϮϭͿ; JaŶa ‘oďiŶsoŶ ͚The eǆpeƌieŶĐe of the Đhild ǁitŶess: Legal aŶd psǇĐhologiĐal issues͛ ;ϮϬϭϱͿ ϰϮ Int J Law 
Psychiatry ϭϲϴ; MaƌǇ Woodǁaƌd aŶd otheƌs ͚Out of the ŵouth of ďaďes: EŶaďliŶg ĐhildƌeŶ to giǀe eǀideŶĐe iŶ 
the justiĐe sǇsteŵ͛ ;ϮϬϭϰͿ ϯϵ;ϭͿ Alt L J 27. 
40
 Henderson (n 34). 
41
 See below, XX-XX. 
42
 Plotnikoff and Woolfson (n 16), 69. 
43
 Judicial College, Equal Treatment Bench Book (2013, Judicial College); CPR 2015, r 3.9(7)(vi). 
44
 See further Mattinson (n 27). 
45
 Home Office (n 23), 2.84-2.85, 3.103-3.109; The Advocates Gateway, Toolkit 14: Understanding 
Communication Aids in the Criminal Justice System (2015, Council of the Inns of the Court: 
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to providing a lucid and informed outline of many of the forms of AAC, emphasises the importance 
of the role of the intermediary in assessing the verbal limitations or idiosyncratic speech patterns of 
a learning disabled witness and recommends a mixture of tools and strategies that might best 
facilitate the evidence of an individual witness.  
The YJCEA has created a framework whereby evidence is much more likely to be received from non-
verbal witnesses providing the competency test is met. Yet notwithstanding the introduction of 
special measures and greater numbers of witnesses with communication difficulties now being 
deemed competent to testify, fears have been expressed that ͚the iŶtiŵidatoƌǇ aŶd iŶtƌusiǀe aŶtiĐs 
employed daily by defence lawyers in a range of contexts have escaped examination.͛46 The onus 
then falls on the trial judge to militate against such tactics.
47
 
Judicial Control 
Under the adversarial paƌadigŵ, judges haǀe loŶg ďeeŶ eǆpeĐted to eǆeƌĐise aŶ ͚uŵpiƌeal͛ ƌole aŶd 
as such have been reticent to intervene to prevent oppressive advocacy lest s/he be seen as 
͚desĐeŶdiŶg fƌoŵ AǀeƌŶus͛,48 aŶd ͚eŶteƌiŶg the aƌeŶa͛ iŶ faǀouƌ of oŶe side oƌ the otheƌ.49 Indeed, 
empirical research confirms judicial intervention to prevent excessive cross-examination of 
vulnerable parties has been relatively rare,
50
 although this may be partly attributable to the fact that 
until recently many have lacked the necessary knowledge about the needs of learning disabled 
witnesses in order to do so.
51
  
Yet, in more recent times, it seems that the judiciary are rising admirably to this challenge, with the 
courts increasingly underlining the need for trial judges to take proactive steps to control the nature 
and substance of cross-examination. This metamorphosis of the judicial role has been spearheaded 
by the Court of Appeal in a line of decisions since 2011, and the Court has made clear that it is 
incumbent on advocates to adapt their questioning so that it reflects the developmental needs of 
the witness.
52
 In Barker
53
 it ǁas stƌessed that adǀoĐates should adapt theiƌ ͚foƌeŶsiĐ teĐhŶiƋues͛ iŶ 
order to enable ďest eǀideŶĐe. This should eŶtail the use of ͚short, simple questions which put the 
esseŶtial eleŵeŶts of the defeŶdaŶt's Đase to the ǁitŶess͛, ǁith aŶǇ ĐoŵŵeŶt oŶ ĐƌediďilitǇ 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
https://www.theadvocatesgateway.org/ [accessed 6 August 2017). These toolkits have been endorsed by the 
Court of Appeal in Lubemba [2015] 1 WLR 1579, 1581; Crim PD I [2015] EWCA Crim 1567, [3D.7]. 
46
 Louise Ellison, The Adversarial Process and the Vulnerable Witness (OUP 2001) 125. 
47
 It is possible, however, that social stereotypes and prejudices that emanate from the demeanour of the 
witness may be neutralised to soŵe eǆteŶt thƌough juƌǇ disĐussioŶ: JaŶŶe Dahl aŶd otheƌs, ͚DisplaǇed 
eŵotioŶs aŶd ǁitŶess ĐƌediďilitǇ: A ĐoŵpaƌisoŶ of judgeŵeŶts ďǇ iŶdiǀiduals aŶd ŵoĐk juƌies͛ ;ϮϬϬϳͿ Ϯϭ;ϵͿ 
Appl Cogn Psychol 1145. 
48
 “eaŶ DoƌaŶ, ͚DesĐeŶt to AǀeƌŶus͛ ;ϭϵϴϵͿ ϭϯϵ NLJ 1147. 
49
 See comments of Stuart-Smith LJ in R v Sharp [1993] 3 All ER 225, 231. 
50
 Eŵŵa Daǀies aŶd Fƌed “eǇŵouƌ, ͚QuestioŶiŶg Đhild ĐoŵplaiŶaŶts of seǆual aďuse: AŶalǇsis of ĐƌiŵiŶal Đouƌt 
tƌaŶsĐƌipts iŶ Neǁ )ealaŶd͛ ;ϭϵϵϴͿ ϱ;ϭͿ Psychiatry Psychol & L 547; Caitriona O'KellǇ aŶd otheƌs, ͚JudiĐial 
iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶ iŶ Đouƌt Đases iŶǀolǀiŶg ǁitŶesses ǁith aŶd ǁithout leaƌŶiŶg disaďilities͛ ;ϮϬϬϯͿ ϴ;ϮͿ Legal Criminol 
Psych 229-ϮϰϬ; ‘aĐhel )ajaĐ aŶd otheƌs, ͚Disoƌdeƌ iŶ the Đouƌtƌooŵ? Child ǁitŶesses uŶdeƌ Đƌoss-eǆaŵiŶatioŶ͛ 
(2012) 32(3) Dev Rev 181-204.  
51
 Maƌk Keďďell aŶd otheƌs, ͚People ǁith leaƌŶiŶg disaďilities as ǁitŶesses iŶ Đouƌt: What ƋuestioŶs should 
laǁǇeƌs ask?͛ ;ϮϬϬϭͿ Ϯϵ;ϯͿ Br J of Learn Disabil 98. 
52
 See further Emily Henderson, ͚All the proper protections: The court of appeal rewrites the rules for the 
cross-examiŶatioŶ of ǀulŶeƌaďle ǁitŶesses͛ ;ϮϬϭϰͿ Cƌiŵ L‘ ϭϬϴ. 
53
 [2010] EWCA Crim 4. 
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following after the testimony has concluded.
54
 Likewise, in E,
 55
 it was stated that steps taken by trial 
judges to place limits on cross-eǆaŵiŶatioŶ ǁould Ŷot oƌdiŶaƌilǇ uŶdeƌŵiŶe the aĐĐused͛s ƌight to a 
fair trial. Underlining the importance of the principle of equality of voice in Cox,
56
 Lord Judge CJ 
outlined the duty on trial judges to adapt proceedings to ensure that those with disabilities were not 
placed at a disadvantage: 
[A]s part of their general responsibilities judges are expected to deal with specific 
communication problems faced by any defendant or any indiǀidual ǁitŶess… as paƌt aŶd 
parcel of their ordinary control of the judicial process. When necessary, the processes have 
to be adapted to ensure that a particular individual is not disadvantaged as a result of 
personal difficulties, whatever form they may take.
57
  
More recently, it was held in Lubemba that trial judges are under a duty to intervene where cross-
examination is confusing or inappropriate, and should set reasonable time limits.
58
 Moreover. this 
line of reasoning is reflected in the Lord Chief JustiĐe͛s CƌiŵiŶal PƌaĐtiĐe DiƌeĐtioŶ ϮϬϭϱ ǁhiĐh 
provides: 
The judiciary is responsible for controlling questioning. Over-rigorous or repetitive cross-
examination of a child or vulnerable witness should be stopped. Intervention by the judge, 
magistrates or intermediary (if any) is minimised if questioning, taking account of the 
iŶdiǀidual͛s ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ Ŷeeds, is disĐussed iŶ adǀaŶĐe aŶd gƌouŶd ƌules aƌe agƌeed aŶd 
adhered to.
59
 
In practice, such limits on cross-examination are enforced through Ground Rules Hearings (GRHs) 
which should be held before a child witness or any other witness with special communication needs 
gives evidence. Such hearings are mandatory in all cases involving intermediaries and recommended 
in others.
60
 The GRH should determine the nature and form of questioning that should be used 
where a vulnerable witness is cross-examined. A range of issues may be considered, including the 
need to avoid repetitive questioning; controlling comment and accusations of lying; time limits on 
cross-examination; the type of vocabulary used in questioning; and the practicalities surrounding 
any intervention by the intermediary.
61
  
While the powers and mechanisms to control the excesses of cross-examination have certainly been 
bolstered, scepticism has been expressed – often with good reason – that the working cultures of 
the legal profession and embedded practices of the adversarial tradition often stymie the reach of 
                                                          
54
 ibid, [42]. 
55
 [2011] EWCA Crim 3028. See also Wills [2012] 1 Cr App R 2. 
56
 Cox (n 30). 
57
 ibid [29]. 
58
 Lubemba (n 44). 
59
 Crim PD I, 3E.1. [2015] EWCA Crim 1567. 
60
 See Crim PR 3.9(7); Crim PD I 3E.2 (2015); R v JP [2014] EWCA Crim 2064. See further Penny Cooper and 
otheƌs, ͚GettiŶg to gƌips ǁith GƌouŶd ‘ules HeaƌiŶgs – a ĐheĐklist foƌ judges, adǀoĐates aŶd iŶteƌŵediaƌies͛ 
(2015) Crim LR 417 (noting that forms of GRHs were occurring as early as 2006). 
61
 ibid.  
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well-intentioned reform.
62
 Ultimately, the success or failure of these changes hangs upon the extent 
to which practitioners, and in particular the judiciary, are prepared to embrace such a radical culture 
change; robust judicial case management is undoubtedly required to ensure that advocates 
understand and comply with legal and policy expectations. Somewhat disconcertingly, the track 
record of advocates (and to a lesser extent, judges) in embracing such reforms aimed at improving 
the experiences of vulnerable witnesses is not particularly encouraging.
63
  
Given that AAC constitutes such a radical departure from the emphasis that has traditionally been 
placed on ebb and flow of adversarial advocacy, there may be good reason to question whether it 
might ever become embedded as a norm of communication. That said, there is evidence that 
attitudes are shifting. In a qualitative study in 2013 involving interviews with criminal advocates 
eǆpeƌieŶĐed iŶ seǆ Đases, HeŶdeƌsoŶ fouŶd ͚a ŵoƌe sophistiĐated uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of the laŶguage 
issues͛ thaŶ that of adǀoĐates iŶteƌǀieǁed ϭϱ Ǉeaƌs pƌeǀiously,64 and also found a genuine desire to 
improve practice and adopt innovation even where this conflicted with embedded traditions. 
Despite these positive overtones, the research concluded that the majority of cross-examiners lack 
the skills and specialist training to cross-examine vulnerable witnesses.
65
 Other studies have arrived 
at similar conclusions,
66
 and have also identified a lack of understanding by other criminal justice 
professionals.
67
 Evidently, without such training many advocates would be ill-placed to know what 
constitutes an inappropriate question or how to elicit comprehensible responses from a non-verbal 
witness.  
 
Competency  
Of course, the AAC technologies discussed above will only be of value where a witness is deemed 
competent to testify. Historically there has been significant suspicion around the evidence of those 
with communication difficulties;
68
 only a few decades ago strict exclusionary principles were applied 
                                                          
62
 Doak (n 32); Ellison (n 46); Matthew Hall, Victims of crime: policy and practice in criminal justice (Willan 
2009). 
63
 See eg Antonia Cretney aŶd GǁǇŶŶ Daǀis, ͚PƌoseĐutiŶg doŵestiĐ assault: ViĐtiŵs failiŶg Đouƌts, oƌ Đouƌts 
failiŶg ǀiĐtiŵs?͛ ;ϭϵϵϳͿ ϯϲ;ϮͿ Howard J ϭϰϲ; Eŵŵa Daǀies aŶd otheƌs ͚IŶ the iŶteƌests of justiĐe? The Đƌoss-
examination of child complainants of sexual abuse in criminal proĐeediŶgs͛ ;ϭϵϵϳͿ ϰ PsǇĐhiatƌǇ, PsǇĐhologǇ, 
aŶd Laǁ, Ϯϭϳ; EllisoŶ ;Ŷ ϰϲͿ; Louise EllisoŶ aŶd VaŶessa MuŶƌo, ͚TakiŶg Tƌauŵa “eƌiouslǇ͛ ;ϮϬϭϳͿ Ϯϭ;ϯͿ 
IŶteƌŶatioŶal JouƌŶal of EǀideŶĐe & Pƌoof ϭϴϯ; EŵilǇ HeŶdeƌsoŶ, ͚CoŵŵuŶiĐatiǀe ĐoŵpeteŶĐe? Judges, 
advocates and intermediaries discuss communication issues in the cross-eǆaŵiŶatioŶ of ǀulŶeƌaďle ǁitŶesses͛ 
[ϮϬϭϱ] Cƌiŵ L‘ ϲϱϵ; O'KellǇ aŶd otheƌs ;Ŷ ϱϬͿ; JeŶŶifeƌ TeŵkiŶ, ͚PƌoseĐutiŶg aŶd defeŶdiŶg ƌape: PeƌspeĐtiǀes 
fƌoŵ the ďaƌ.͛ ;ϮϬϬϬͿ Ϯϳ;ϮͿ JLS 219-248; Helen WesĐott, ͚Child WitŶess TestiŵoŶǇ: What do ǁe kŶoǁ aŶd 
ǁheƌe aƌe ǁe goiŶg?͛ ;ϮϬϬϲͿ CFLQ ϭϳϱ. 
64
 Henderson (n 63). 
65
 Henderson (n 63) 676. 
66
 NiĐholas Bala ͚Child ǁitŶesses iŶ the CaŶadiaŶ ĐƌiŵiŶal Đouƌts: ‘eĐogŶiziŶg theiƌ ĐapaĐities aŶd Ŷeeds͛ ;ϭϵϵϵͿ 
2 Psychol Public Policy Law ϯϮϯ; EŵilǇ HeŶdeƌsoŶ, ͚PeƌsuadiŶg aŶd ĐoŶtƌolliŶg: The theoƌǇ of Đƌoss-
eǆaŵiŶatioŶ iŶ ƌelatioŶ to ĐhildƌeŶ͛ iŶ HeleŶ WestĐott aŶd otheƌs ;edsͿ, ChildƌeŶ͛s testiŵoŶǇ: A haŶdďook of 
psychological research and forensic practice (John Wiley & Sons 2002); Kebbell and others (n 51); Zajac and 
others (n 50). 
67
 Katie Maras and others, 'Autism in the Courtroom: Experiences of Legal Professionals and the Autism 
CoŵŵuŶitǇ͛ ;ϮϬϭϳͿ ϰϳ;ϴͿ J Autisŵ Deǀ Disoƌd ϮϲϭϬ. 
68
 See generally John R Spencer and Michael Lamb (eds.), Children and cross-examination: Time to change the 
rules? (Bloomsbury Publishing 2012). 
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in relation to the testimony of children
69
 or those living with a mental illness.
70
 Section 53 of the 
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (YJCEA) provides for a presumption of competency 
in respect of all witnesses though this is rebuttable where a party can show that a witness is unable 
to understand questions o r  give answers that cannot be understood.
71
 Whilst a learning disability 
involving a severe language impairment may not in itself preclude a witness from testifying, it could 
provide grounds for one party to query competence, in which case the party calling the witness is 
required to prove that s/he is able to communicate intelligibly on the balance of probabilities.
72 In 
practice, any issues around competency of a witness of issues will be identified at an early stage in 
the process, and the court may question the witness, consider expert evidence, and evaluate 
extracts from the recording of the ABE interview as part of any competency hearing. Any 
determination reached at that point in the process may be revisited by the trial judge after cross-
examination.
73
  
In recent times the higher courts have made clear that testimony ought to be received where 
possible, even if this would involve a radical departure from the traditional oral hearing. In R v 
Watts,
74
 the complainant had Cerebral Palsy and was only capable of uttering a few limited words. 
As the Court of Appeal noted, the parliamentary intention underpinning the 1999 Act is that 
those who are competent to give evidence should be assisted to do so.75 The Court has also 
stressed that fulfilment of the competency requirement does not hinge upon the ability of the 
witness to offer detailed or intelligible replies to all questions, rather the court should look to form 
an overall impression.
76
 This view was echoed in Barker,
77
 where the Court drew an important 
distinction between competency and credibility. While the former was a question of intelligibility, 
the latter was a question of weight for the jury.
78
 Thus theƌe should ďe Ŷo ͚iŵpliĐit stigŵa͛ ƌelatiŶg to 
child witnesses, and nor should children be regarded as inherently less reliable. For Hallet LJ, it is 
essentially reduced to the principle of equal access to justice: 
The purpose of the trial process is to identify the evidence which is reliable and that which is 
not, whether it comes from an adult or a child. If competent, as defined by the statutory 
criteria, in the context of credibility in the forensic process, the child witness starts off on the 
basis of equality with every other witness. In trial by jury, his or her credibility is to be 
assessed by the jury, taking into account every specific personal characteristic which may 
bear on the issue of credibility, along with the rest of the available evidence.
79
 
Although these remarks were made in the context of child witnesses, it is evident that they also 
apply to witnesses with learning disabilities:  
                                                          
69
 R v Wallwork [1958] 42 Cr App R 153. 
70
 R v Bellamy (1986) 82 Cr App R 222. Indeed, it was formerly the case that the witness had to believe in some 
form of divine sanction: Attorney General v Bradlaugh (1885) 14 QBD 667. 
71
 YJCEA 1999, s 53(3). 
72
 YJCEA 1999, s 54(2). 
73
 R v Malicki [2009] EWCA Crim 365; PACE 1984, s78 may be used as a basis on which to exclude evidence 
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These statutory provisions are not limited to the evidence of children. They apply to 
individuals of unsound mind. They apply to the infirm. The question in each case is whether 
the individual witness, or, as in this case, the individual child, is competent to give evidence 
in the particular trial.
80
 
Moreover, whilst factors such as age and the nature and extent of any learning disability ought to be 
taken into account, these should not be determinative and the ultimate question for the court to 
determine is whether the evidence as a whole is intelligible: 
The question is entirely witness or child specific. There are no presumptions or 
preconceptions. The witness need not understand the special importance that the truth 
should be told in court, and the witness need not understand every single question or give a 
readily understood answer to every question. Many competent adult witnesses would fail 
such a competency test. Dealing with it broadly and fairly, provided the witness can 
understand the questions put to him and can also provide understandable answers, he or 
she is competent.
81
  
The rules introduced by the 1999 Act governing the competency of witnesses are of symbolic, as well 
as practical, importance. As Spencer notes: 
[T]he ƌules ͚ŵaƌk the fiŶal tƌaŶsitioŶ fƌoŵ a sǇsteŵ ǁheƌe the Đouƌts ƌefused to heaƌ all soƌts 
of persons for fear they might not tell the truth, to one where the courts listen to everybody, 
and try to decide whether they are truthful or not on the basis of ǁhat theǇ haǀe said͛.82 
The judicial plasticity regarding the competency requirements has enabled many more witnesses 
with learning disabilities, including non-verbal victims, to give evidence in recent years. It is also 
consistent with psychological evidence regarding the capacity of learning disabled witnesses to give 
reliable evidence. Providing the witness is equipped with the correct tools to understand questions 
and give intelligible answers, there are no grounds for a blanket policy exclusion.
83
 Even where 
witnesses are deemed not to be competent, potentially, a hearsay statement may be admitted 
where the court deems that the interests of justice require it
84
 (competency is not a precondition in 
such instances).
85
 However, even where many non-verbal witnesses are considered competent, 
fears around how juries will perceive the credibility of such witnesses impede the prospects of 
many such cases reaching trial and there is evidence to suggest that the CPS has traditionally 
exercised caution in proceeding.
86
 In the section below, we seek to unpick some of the reasons why 
their testimonies are often viewed as suspect. 
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Credibility: A Problem of Perception 
Manifestations of learning disabilities – mostly around communication and social function – 
sometimes result in certain witnesses being perceived as less credible or reliable. In particular, non-
verbal individuals with autism may exhibit atypical forms of behaviour in stressful environments 
such as poorly modulated eye contact, unusual body movements (eg rocking, hand-flapping or 
clapping), hesitation in answering questions and odd vocal responses (eg echolalia or random 
sounds). These may negatively affect how a non-verbal witness is perceived by both criminal justice 
professionals (such as police officers, prosecutors, advocates or intermediaries) and, where the case 
proceeds to trial, the judge and jury.
87
  
Such cues may give the impression that a witness is being deceptive, less sincere, or uncertain of the 
facts, though this erroneous and widely held assumption has been comprehensively rebutted by 
psychological research.
88
 Even if the prosecution believe that the witness is likely to pass the 
competency threshold, the prosecution may still not proceed if it is determined that the likelihood of 
a conviction is reduced by how the witness may perform in court. 
The secrecy surrounding jury deliberations means that it is difficult to discern the impact certain 
idiosyncratic behaviours on jury decision-making.
89
 However, research based around mock juries as 
well as evidence from other jurisdictions suggest there is strong evidence that witnesses with 
learning disabilities are less likely to be believed in giving evidence (although there is no specific 
existent research on perceptions of AAC users).
90
 Vaƌious ͚testiŵoŶial faĐtoƌs͛ aƌe said to affeĐt 
credibility, such as perception, memory, communication and sincerity;
91
 and even others that have 
ĐleaƌlǇ Ŷo ƌeleǀaŶĐe ǁhatsoeǀeƌ, suĐh as ͚attƌaĐtiǀeŶess͛, haǀe ďeeŶ doĐuŵeŶted as faĐtoƌs takeŶ 
into account.
92
 However, it has been established that although those with learning difficulties may 
recall less detail in response to open-ended questions than neurotypical witnesses,
93
  the accuracy of 
their recall is generally high although their answers may be perceived as vague or confused.
94
 Henry 
and others found that many mock jurors noted how they appeared to be distracted or 
disinterested.
95
 Overall, there seems to be a discrepancy between the ability of such witnesses to 
offer accurate testimony and jurors' perceptions of their ability.
96
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Learning disabled witnesses are also much more likely to be open to suggestion when questioned by 
authority figures in unfamiliar environments.
97
 In turn, they are more likely to acquiesce and provide 
the answer that they believe the questioner is seeking as opposed to attempting accurate recall.
98
 Or 
they may simply comply in order to escape the confines of a stressful setting.
99
 These risks are 
particularly pertinent at both the investigative and trial stages of the criminal process, where 
evidence confirms that high stress levels, coupled with inappropriate questioning techniques, may 
negatively affect the ability of vulnerable witnesses to recall past events accurately.
100
 Stereotyping 
and biases against AAC users may be even more prominent given that there appears to  be a 
correlation between perceived maturity and credibility.
101
 In other words, the sharp contrast 
between the communicative style of a learning disabled AAC user against the expectation of how a 
neurotypical witness of the same age should communicate might further undermine credibility. 
In addition, these erroneous indicators of credibility are often exacerbated by the impact of trauma 
which by itself may negatively impact upon memory recall and be wrongly interpreted as an 
indicator of mendacity.
102
 As Ellison and Munro highlight, trauma victims often live with fragmented 
memories, lacking in specific detail and framed without a linear narrative.
103
 As the impact of trauma 
on memory recall is not widely known, the authors contend that jurors ought to be provided with 
this information in order to inform their decision making.
104
  
A further dimension of credibility turns on how the presence of an intermediary and/or AAC 
pƌoǀisioŶ Đould iŶflueŶĐe the Đouƌt͛s peƌĐeptioŶ of the ͚ǀaliditǇ͛ aŶd ͚authoƌship͛ of the eǀideŶĐe. BǇ 
͚ǀaliditǇ͛, ǁe ƌefeƌ to the eǆteŶt to ǁhiĐh the eǆpƌessed message is deemed to reflect what the 
ǁitŶess ǁished to ĐoŶǀeǇ to the Đouƌt; aŶd ďǇ ͚authoƌship͛ ǁe ƌefeƌ to the eǆteŶt to ǁhiĐh the 
expressed message is deemed to have been constructed by the witness themselves.  With regard to 
validity, questions might arise around the size of the symbol/signed vocabulary set used by the 
witness and whether limited vocabulary might give rise to approximated and misleading meanings 
;foƌ iŶstaŶĐe, the ǀeƌď ͚touĐh͛ has a plethoƌa of ƌelated ǀeƌďs suĐh as ͚gƌaď͛ aŶd ͚Đaƌess͛ ǁith ǀeƌǇ 
different connotations of intensity, intention and reciprocity).  Similarly, given the unfortunate 
history of Facilitated Communication in the courtroom
105
 combined with the clearly visible support 
from an intermediary and/or communication device; questions could arise about the extent to which 
the witness independently authored the AAC-mediated message of their own volition.  Toolkit 14 
does not explicitly address this issue in its advice to intermediaries, seemingly working on the 
assumption that the witness will physically produce their own communication output through (for 
example) signing or independent manual operating of a device; and that the various elements of 
iŶteƌŵediaƌǇ ͚good pƌaĐtiĐe͛ ƌeĐoŵŵeŶded suĐh as poiŶtiŶg to tiŵeliŶes oƌ tƌaŶslating unclear 
speeĐh foƌ the Đouƌt ǁill Ŷot Đoŵpƌoŵise peƌĐeptioŶs of ͚authoƌship͛ iŶ aŶǇ ǁaǇ.   
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We are conscious that even discussing the very concepts of ͚ǀaliditǇ͛ aŶd ͚authoƌship͛ of AAC-
mediated evidence runs the risk of what Ashby describes as the ͚otheƌiŶg͛ that takes plaĐe ǁheŶ a 
particular (disabled) group are made the subject of special scrutiny in a way that non-disabled 
people are not.
106
  This concern is relevant in the current context: we would argue that AAC users 
are not categorically different from verbal ǁitŶesses ǁhose oƌal ͚ǀaliditǇ͛ oƌ ͚authoƌship͛ ŵight ďe 
compromised by any number of factors including limited vocabulary; low educational level; 
susceptibility to stress; or acquiescence to the suggestions of an aggressive cross-examiner.  On this 
ďasis, ͚ǀaliditǇ͛ aŶd ͚authoƌship͛ ĐoŶĐeƌŶs should thus ďe dealt ǁith oŶ aŶ ad hoĐ ďasis ƌatheƌ thaŶ iŶ 
the form of presumptions about whole categories of witnesses.   At the same time, it seems 
preferable to explicitly acknowledge that AAC may giǀe ƌise to paƌtiĐulaƌ ĐoŶĐeƌŶs aƌouŶd ͚ǀaliditǇ͛ 
aŶd ͚authoƌship͛ iŶ the ŵiŶds of juƌoƌs, adǀoĐates aŶd otheƌs ǁho aƌe uŶfaŵiliaƌ ǁith its usage; 
rather than leaving this as a dangerous unconscious prejudice.  Further theoretical unpacking of this 
issue may be necessary to explore (for example) whether providing jurors with reports on an AAC 
useƌ͛s tǇpiĐal ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatiǀe stǇle aŶd ƌepeƌtoiƌe ǁould help to ĐhalleŶge uŶfouŶded assuŵptioŶs 
on the basis of appearances and encourage rational, conscious evaluation of likely validity and 
authorship; or alternatively further stigmatise AAC users by problematising issues which are not 
generally raised in the case of speaking witnesses. 
Yet, as suggested above, the greatest single barrier to the issue of credibility is located within the 
confines of the adversarial paradigm itself. The belief in the primacy afforded to oral evidence has 
informed the evolution of the rules of criminal procedure and evidence for centuries.
107
 There is 
something of an inbuilt perception that oral forms of evidence are superior to other forms (such as 
ǁƌitteŶ eǀideŶĐe oƌ ͚ƌeal͛ eǀideŶĐeͿ; thus adǀeƌsaƌial pƌoĐeediŶgs haǀe plaĐed a stƌoŶg eŵphasis oŶ 
the proper use of articulate and detailed oral accounts that can be readily challenged through cross-
examination in court. Accounts that appear confused, disjointed and inarticulate are portrayed as 
untrustworthy; little allowance has been afforded to pertinent questions posed by psychologists 
around the reliability of memory or the capacity for factual recall under stress.  At every stage of the 
criminal process there is an inherent assumption that participants are verbally equipped to report 
offences, explain their actions, and answer questions to aid the investigative and trial processes. 
It is well documented that the nature of the adversarial trial is a source of secondary victimisation 
for many victims and witnesses,
 108
 but the sequelae are significantly exacerbated among those who 
live with learning difficulties, some of whom will have minimal understanding of its nature and 
function.
109
 In particular, the convoluted and unfamiliar language of the courtroom, coupled with the 
use of forensically tuned linguistic devices adopted by cross-examiners, have been widely decried as 
mechanisms which are deliberately used to confuse and disorientate vulnerable witnesses.
 110
 While 
the introduction of special measures and a more robust judicial stance on controlling of cross-
examination have served to militate against  some of the worst excesses of the adversarial trial, its 
structural orientation as an oral duel between prosecution and defence continues to discriminate 
against those least able to participate within this paradigm. 
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Addressing the Credibility Deficit 
Two suggestions can be made in addressing issues pertaining to credibility. First, the wider use of 
expert evidence (particularly that of a psychologist or psychiatrist) may militate against negative 
perceptions of credibility and reliability. In particular, it could be used to explain that some of the 
manifestations of disability outlined do not equate to an inability to provide truthful and accurate 
evidence.
111
 
Unfortunately, there is a longstanding rule that expert evidence pertaining to issues of credibility is 
generally inadmissible.
112
 Thus in R v Robinson
113
 the Court of Appeal held that the prosecution 
should not have been permitted to recall a psychologist to give evidence as to whether or not the 
complainant was suggestible and liable to fantasise; exceptions to the rule in Toohey only applied 
where the prosecution sought to pre-empt or rebut any suggestion by the defence that the evidence 
should be disregarded due to mental abnormality. On these grounds, Robinson was distinguished in 
R v S (VJ),
114
 where the appellant had been convicted of a range of sexual offences against a 13-year-
old girl who had autism. A paediatrician gave evidence that the demeanour of the complainant in a 
video interview was not unusual for someone with autism, and, in general, autistic people would be 
highly unlikely to invent such a story and retain it in their memory. The appellant contended that this 
evidence was essentially an effort to boost credibility and, as such, should have been excluded. The 
appeal, however, was rejected on the grounds that the evidence was of generic application since it 
was a trait common to all people living with autism and did not pertain to the specific capabilities of 
a particular witness.  
Although the clarification of the law in S may assist non-verbal victims who live with a clinical label, 
this is not always the case and non-verbalism may be attributable to an unidentified or undiagnosed 
condition.
115
 The broader rule (ie, prohibiting expert evidence of issues of credibility of a specific 
witness) has been roundly criticised on the grounds that ͚the ƋuestioŶs ǁhiĐh it is iŵpoƌtaŶt foƌ a 
jury to decide for itself may be the very questions on which it most needs expert advice if it is to 
aǀoid seƌious iŶjustiĐe͛.116 There appears be a compelling case for reform; expert evidence is widely 
used to such ends in others jurisdictions
117
 and it seems intuitively odd to adopt a stance whereby 
experts are unable to tailor their evidence to reflect the particular difficulties of individual witnesses. 
An alternative (or additional) solution may lie in trial judges providing the jury with some direction 
on these matters. While judicial warnings have long been commonplace on matters such as  suspect 
identification, delays in making sexual complaints, accomplice evidence, histories of false allegations 
and previous convictions, there is little evidence that they are issued regularly in respect of issues 
pertaining to demeanour and perceptions of credibility.
118
 In light of the expansive evidence that 
demeanour is a poor indicator of veracity, calls have been made for a mandatory demeanour 
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warning, particularly in regard to evidence from vulnerable groups.
119
 The possibility was rejected by 
the New Zealand Court of Appeal in E v R,
120
 which seemed to prefer the historical practice for juries 
being free to evaluate demeanour as an indicator of credibility over the weight of social scientific 
evidence against it. From our perspective however, is clear that such a mechanism holds the 
potential to address negative stereotyping in relation to learning disabled witnesses, particularly 
when the opportunities for experts to inform juries is so limited.
121
 
 
Conclusions  
Non-verbal victims, at least those who are capable of understanding basic questions and offering 
intelligible answers, are now afforded an opportunity not only to have their voices heard, but also to 
have those voices considered seriously at both the investigative and trial stages of the criminal 
process. In addition to these developmentally sensitive adjustments to law, policy and procedure, 
the courts have exercised considerable juridical vigour in facilitating the best evidence of atypical 
vulnerable witnesses, and the Advocates Training Council and Judicial College have also been 
proactive in promoting specialist education and training. 
It is encouraging to see the legal profession demonstrate that they are open to challenging 
traditional assumptions about learning disabled witnesses and exhibit an openness towards reform. 
These changes will take soŵe tiŵe to eŵďed, aŶd ĐhalleŶges still lie ahead iŶ ͚ŵaiŶstƌeaŵiŶg͛ 
alternatives to oral evidence. But it is anticipated that in the years ahead more non-verbal victims 
will feel able to exercise their voice and will receive appƌopƌiate suppoƌt to ĐoŶǀeǇ oŶe͛s ŵessage; 
have the content of that message carefully considered; and subsequently exert an influence on the 
decision-making in both the investigative and trial phases of the criminal process.  It is hoped, and 
expected, that in time this will boost reporting and conviction rates, and reduce attrition rates. 
While this article has focused on the trial process, some of the lessons set out here may inform 
future approaches concerning participation in other facets of the criminal process, such as 
requesting information about their case or challenging charging decisions. If this is accomplished, we 
are well on the road to establishing a more equal, legitimate and inclusionary criminal justice system 
where all witnesses are enabled to participate irrespective of their cognitive or developmental 
capabilities. 
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